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Purpose – Aims to determine whether red flags can be helpful for external auditors in detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting. The research explores whether external auditors demographic factors affect external auditors’ 
perception about the ability of red flags to detect fraudulent financial reporting in Egypt. 
Design/methodology/approach – Data was collected using a questionnaire that was pretested by a pilot 
study. A questionnaire was then distributed to a sample of 100 external auditors working in different audit firms in 
Egypt and having different years of experience. The sample of external auditors was randomly selected.  
Findings – According to external auditors’ opinion, red flags are helpful in detecting fraud. Our research 
didn’t support the effect of external auditors’ experience and type of audit office on auditors’ perception about red 
flags ability to detect fraudulent financial reporting. 
Research Limitations – two external auditors from the big 4 international audit firms filled in the 
questionnaire, thus our results can’t be generalized to all audit firms in Egypt. There can also be other red flags in 
the literature that aren’t mentioned in the research study. 
Originality/value - Our research included a list of specific red flags for fraudulent financial reporting that 
were highly accepted by the sample of external auditors in our study. These specific red flags can be used in 
conjunction with SAS 99 red flags to enhance external auditors’ ability in detecting fraudulent financial reporting. 
The research also ranked all red flags for fraudulent financial reporting according to their relative importance based 
on external auditor opinion which can help auditors to focus their efforts more on high quality red flags during 
brainstorming sessions which will in turn facilitate fraud detection. Future research should be more directed toward 
listing other red flags for fraudulent financial reporting in the literature and should test them using other methods 
like experiments or interviews. The list of red flags presented in our research can for a good base for future 
researchers. 
 




Over the past decade, there were numerous examples of fraud cases and alleged auditor negligence such 
as the case of Enron/Arthur Andersen, Xerox/KPMG, and WorldCom/Arthur Andersen. For many people, scandals 
taking place in companies such as Enron and WorldCom in the USA are synonymous with “fraudulent financial 
reporting”. In many cases against auditors, the auditors failed to obtain appropriate evidence or failed to recognize 
and follow up on red flags during the audits (Kalbers; 2007; P.1). Historically, external auditors have counted on 
internal control as the main defense against fraud, but this cannot only work by itself as managers themselves can 
override controls. Fraud can be divided into three main categories as mentioned by (ACFE: 2008, P.5): Asset 
misappropriation, fraudulent financial reporting, and corruption. However, in our research the focus will be on 
fraudulent financial reporting because as stated by the ACFE report (2008; P.6), financial statement fraud is the 
most costly type of fraud where it caused a median loss of $2 million. Besides, fraudulent financial reports can have 
a substantial negative impact on a company’s existence as well as market value.  
This study has several objectives. First, it seeks to determine whether red flags listed by SAS 99 can help 
external auditors in detecting fraudulent financial reporting. Second, it seeks to determine whether red flags that 
were not mentioned in SAS 99 but mentioned in the audit literature can also be helpful in detecting financial 
statement fraud. Third, identifying the most important red flags as perceived by external auditors in Egypt, and 
finally, it explores whether auditors demographic factors (e.g. type of audit office and auditors experience) might 
affect auditors’ perception of the relative importance of red flags in general. Our research paper is organized as 
follows; the first section includes the review of the literature along with the development of the research 
hypotheses, then research method and data collection are described in the second section while the research data 
analysis and results are presented in the third section and finally the research summary and conclusion are 
included in the fourth section. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
  
To serve as the cornerstone of its anti-fraud program, the Auditing Standards Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued SAS No.82: consideration of fraud in a financial statements 
audit that was then superseded by SAS No.99: consideration of fraud in a financial statements audit.  
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SAS no. 82 requires the auditor to specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial 
statements due to fraud in every audit. It describes two types of fraud — fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. The auditor is not expected to assess the risk of fraud as high, medium or low, as might 
be the case in assessing control risk. Rather, SAS no. 82 asks the auditor to consider risk factors relating to 
fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. It also provided examples of fraud risk factors that, 
when present, might indicate the presence of fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets. However, 
as stated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2007; P.6), SAS No. 82 focused on a typical list 
of fraud risk factors that, in practice, were usually reduced to a checklist that individual auditors completed without 
practical application and included in their working papers. Thus, SAS 99 superseded SAS 82. Although the 
auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud has not changed from SAS No.82, as stated by Casabona, and Grego 
(2003; p.3), SAS No.99 provides more guidance on how the auditor should plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether or not the financial statements contain material misstatements because of 
errors or fraud. SAS No. 99 identifies red flags as risk factors and categorizes those risk factors in three conditions 
for fraud arising from fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriations of assets. These conditions are referred 
to as the fraud triangle and they are: incentives/pressures, opportunities, and rationalization/attitudes.  
SAS 99 introduced a new audit procedure which is a brainstorming session that must be performed on 
every engagement. In brainstorming sessions, audit team members discuss how and where they believe the 
entity's financial statements might be susceptible to material misstatement due to fraud. They should also discuss 
how management could perpetrate and conceal fraudulent financial reporting. The quality of the red flags on the 
final list produced as a result of the brainstorming session could be more important than the overall quantity of the 
ideas listed. However, SAS 99 didn’t mention how auditors can decide on the quality of red flags for fraud. In our 
research a list of red flags for financial statement fraud will be presented and arranged according to their likely 
hood of occurrence thus, reducing the time that auditors would take in brainstorming less important red flags. 
Furthermore, the PCAOB was also concerned about the role of auditors in detecting fraud as it requires 
changing the nature, timing and extent of auditing procedures needed to address identified risks of material 
misstatement due to fraud. The changes that are described by the PCAOB include; the nature of auditing 
procedures may require obtaining evidence that is more reliable or verifiable, the timing of substantive tests might 
need to be adjusted, the extent of the procedures employed should reflect the assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud (PCAOB; 2007; P.2-6). Moreover, Apostolou and Crumbley (2008, PP.1-4) mentioned 
that, International Standards on Auditing No. 240 provides similar directions to auditors as its American counterpart 
SAS 99 with respect to fraud. Both present specific requirements for auditors to follow like; considering a 
company's internal controls and procedures, and how these are actually implemented when planning the audit, 
designing and conducting audit procedures to respond to the risk that management could override internal controls 
and procedures, identifying specific risks where fraud may occur, considering whether any misstatement uncovered 
during the audit may be indicative of fraud, obtaining fraud-related written representations from management, and 
communicating with appropriate managers and the board if the auditor finds an indication that fraud may have 
occurred. 
 In summary, the above standards show that the efforts of standards’ setters were directed toward 
narrowing the expectation gap through increasing auditors’ responsibility for detecting fraud, however in fact 
regardless of these efforts, the expectation gap still exists. This is supported by what Chemuturi (2008, p.20) 
mentioned in his research where he believes that current professional standards and authoritative guidance require 
auditors to provide reasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatements, whether 
caused by errors or fraud. However, the lack of a commonly accepted definition of reasonable assurance along 
with limitations of audit methods in identifying fraud, cost constraints of audits, and high expectations by investors 
have widened the expectation gap regarding auditor responsibility for detecting fraud. Also, Albrecht, Albrecht, & 
Albrecht (2008, PP.2-12) stated that the new standards have helped auditors better detect fraud as they became 
more proactive in brainstorming possible frauds, working with audit committees and management to assess fraud 
risks. However, auditors are not trained in determining when people are telling the truth or are being deceptive, 
when documents are real or forged, whether collusion is taking place, or whether fictitious documents have been 
created, thus their research showed that auditors still need guidance in the area of fraud detection. 
In addition to that, one of the primary criticism of SAS 99 as found in Wikepedia (2010, p.1) is that; Many 
procedures are suggested rather than required. For example, it is suggested that auditors consider surprise 
procedures like showing up unannounced for an inventory count. In actual practice auditors often tell clients which 
inventory locations they are going to ‘observe.’ Telling clients which locations are going to be audited makes it easy 
to commit inventory fraud. Another criticism is that SAS 99 doesn’t close expectation gaps. The guidelines and 
suggestions provided in the standard increase expectations on the profession. As a result, auditors must consider 
the requirements of SAS 99 as the minimum level of work required to detect fraud. They must be prepared to 
defend any decision not to pursue one of the recommended procedures listed in SAS 99. 
On the Other hand, fraud in general and financial statement fraud in particular was a priority in most of the 
academic research. The ACFE (2008, p.2) classified fraudulent financial reporting into five main categories which 
are; revenue recognition, timing difference, concealed liabilities and expenses, improper disclosure, and improper 
asset valuation. Some researchers talked about the different types of fraudulent financial reporting and red flags 
that can be associated with such scheme such as Albrecht (2006; P.3) where the main findings showed that the 
most common accounts manipulated when perpetrating financial statement fraud are revenues or accounts 
receivable. He introduced a number of specific revenue-related exposures that need to be considered by external 
auditors while auditing their clients because these exposures are the various fraud schemes that can be used to 
misstate the financial statements. Examples for such fraud schemes are; Recording fictitious sales, recognize 
revenues too early, or overstate real sales, or understating allowance for doubtful accounts, thus overstating 
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receivables, or not recording returned goods from customers or recording returned goods after the end of the 
period. Besides, not writing off uncollectible receivables or write off uncollectible receivables in later periods or 
record bank transfers as cash received from customers or manipulating cash received from related parties, and not 
recognizing discounts given to customers. 
Besides, the Committee of Sponsored Organization of the Treadway Committee sponsored a study in 1997 
and found that over half of all financial statement frauds involved revenues or accounts receivable accounts and 
that recording fictitious revenues was the most common way to manipulate revenue accounts. It also reported that 
recording revenues prematurely was the second most common type of revenue-related financial statement fraud. In 
addition to that, Hogan et al (2008; P.242 as cited in Beasley et al 2000) stated that, “common revenue fraud 
techniques include sham sales, false confirmations, premature revenue recognition before the terms of the sale are 
completed, modified terms through side letters, improper cutoff, unauthorized shipments, and consignment sales”.  
Moreover, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2007; P.3) has found that, the third type of 
fraudulent financial reporting which is concealed liabilities and expenses, is much easier to commit than falsifying 
many sales transactions. Missing transactions are generally harder for auditors to detect than improperly recorded 
ones because there is no audit trail and that there are three common methods for concealing liabilities and 
expenses which are: Liability/expense omissions, capitalized expenses, and Failure to disclose warranty costs and 
liabilities. It gives examples of fraud schemes involving concealed liabilities like; record payable in subsequent 
period, or not recording purchases, or overstating purchase returns & purchase discounts, not accruing liabilities or 
Record accruals in later period, not recording warranty liabilities or under-record liabilities or recording deposits as 
revenues or Not record repurchase agreements and commitments. Besides, borrowing from related parties or not 
recording contingent liabilities or recording contingent liabilities at too low an amount. 
Also, Wells (2005, P. 119) mentioned how improper disclosure scheme can take place as a form of 
fraudulent financial reporting and provided examples of this scheme. He mentioned that improper disclosure 
involves liability omissions, subsequent events, management fraud, related party transaction, and accounting 
changes. Examples for liability omissions include failure to disclose loan covenants or contingent liabilities. On the 
other hand, Hogan et al (2008; P. 244 as cited by Gordon et al; 2007) provided a summary of research on related 
party transactions and find that the mere presence of related party transactions does not appear to increase auditor 
risk assessments; however the research also suggests that related party transactions is one of the top reasons 
cited for audit failure when a fraud does occur. Besides, Beasley et al (2001; P.4) investigated 56 firms whose 
auditors were subject to actions by the SEC, for their association with fraudulent financial statements and found 
that 27 percent of their sample firms had instances where the auditor had either failed to recognize or disclose 
related party transactions which in turn translated into reporting of inflated asset values.  
Improper asset valuations, however, as stated by Wells; (2005, P.89) usually fall into one of the following 
categories: inventory valuation, accounts receivable, business combinations (such as mergers and acquisitions), 
and fixed assets. He included some examples of fraud schemes involving misstating assets accounts such as; 
Overstating asset costs with related parties or not recording depreciation or collusion with outside parties to 
overstate assets e.g.; allocating inventory costs to fixed assets or Using market values rather than book values to 
record assets or having the wrong entity is the purchaser or allocating costs among assets in inappropriate ways or 
recording fictitious assets or inflating the value of assets in intercompany accounts or transactions, or Misstating 
marketable securities with the aid of related parties or misappropriation of cash resulting in misstated financial 
statements without management’s knowledge, or Covering thefts of cash or other assets by overstating receivables 
or inventory. One of the major forms of assets misstatements is inventory fraud that has been such a significant 
problem historically in many companies because if cost of goods sold is understated, net income will be overstated 
by an equal amount. As stated by Albrecht et al (2006; P.8);  
Cost of goods sold can be understated by understate purchases, overstate purchase returns, understate 
purchase discounts, or overstate ending inventory. Among these alternatives, overstating end-of-period inventory 
tends to be the most common because it not only increases net income, but also increases recorded assets and 
makes the balance sheet look better.  
A good number of academic research were also concerned about the effectiveness of red flags in fraud 
detection such as what Silverstone and Michael stated below: 
The most important qualities the accounting professional can bring to any fraud investigation are an 
investigative mindset and skepticism. The skeptical mindset is something that has long been inherent in forensic 
accountants and other internal investigators when looking for evidence of fraud. With the emergence of SAS 99 
and under increasing scrutiny, the external auditor is now being pushed to think like the forensic accountant which 
means to think like both a thief and a detective and be constantly looking for the weak links in the accounting 
system and among the people who staff it. What turns a well-trained and experienced accounting professional into 
a good financial investigator is the knowledge of human behavior and a sixth sense for red flags for fraud and a 
good intuitive feel for the significance of evidence. (2007, PP.61-62) 
Besides, the ACFE’s report to the nation on occupational fraud and abuse that was published in (2008, P.9) 
included some examples of the top 10 red flags of fraud such as: living beyond the person’s means, financial 
difficulties, control issues and unwillingness to share duties, divorce/family problems, unusually close association 
with vendor/customer, irritability, suspiciousness or defensiveness, addiction problems, past legal problems, and 
past employment problems. Another research that was carried by Bossard and Blum (2004; P.2) introduced real life 
fraud cases such as the case of WorldCom that overstated its reported income by approximately $9 billion and 
WorldCom was able to both strengthen its balance sheet and improve its net income through this fraud. The 
authors mentioned that this fraudulent financial reporting could have been detected using red flags like; journal 
entries may be recorded without supporting documents or accounting rationale, entries are made in round dollar 
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amounts and booked late in the closing process. Entries may also be reversed and rebooked for a different amount 
or posted by unusual personnel.  
Moreover, Vicky, B., Hoffman, H., Morgan, K., and Patton, J. (1996) supported the use of red flags in fraud 
detection where they stated that knowing the most important warning signs should help auditors do a better job of 
assessing fraud risk. They also mentioned that while current and proposed auditing standards require auditors to 
make this assessment, they don’t provide guidance on the relative importance of particular signs. By seeing which 
factors other auditors considered to be the most important, practicing auditors can assess the risk of fraud in their 
own audit engagements more efficiently and consistently. Their paper listed some red flags for fraudulent financial 
reporting such as managers have lied to the auditors, the auditors’ experience with management indicates a 
degree of dishonesty, management has engaged in frequent disputes with auditors, the client has engaged in 
opinion shopping and management places undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections or other qualitative 
targets. 
On the other hand, studies examining the use of questionnaires or checklists in assessing fraud risk have 
found mixed results. In one of the first studies in this area, Pincus (1989; P.1) examines the efficacy of a red flags’ 
questionnaire for assessing the risk of material fraud of a client using 137 auditors as subjects. Her findings 
suggest that the use of a questionnaire was dysfunctional for the fraud case where questionnaire users assessed 
the fraud risk to be lower than nonusers. While Glover et al (2003; P.4), find support for the use of questionnaires 
by comparing pre and post SAS No.82 planning judgments. The authors find that post SAS No.82 judgments are 
more sensitive to fraud risk factors. For instance post SAS 82 participants are more aware of the need to modify 
audit plans and are more likely to increase the extent of their audit tests in response to increased fraud risk as 
compared with the pre SAS 82 participants. Moreover, Saksena, (2010; P4) also supported the use of red flags 
checklist for fraud detection as her paper included a checklist containing top 25 red flags for fraud and she is 
convinced that through the use of a potential fraud signals checklist all auditors would be able to review their clients 
for the top 25 fraud schemes and that for auditors to be effective in their efforts they need to learn from their and 
other professionals experiences. 
This debate about the effectiveness of red flags in fraud detection increased our interest in determining 
whether red flags associated with fraudulent financial reporting can really help external auditors in detecting such 
fraud scheme in Egypt. The red flags included in this research paper were obtained from SAS No.99 list of red flags 
for financial statement fraud and from other academic research in the literature. Thus, the following hypotheses 
were derived from the literature: 
H1: SAS 99 red flags for fraudulent financial reporting can help auditors in identifying this fraud scheme 
H2: Other red flags associated with each type of fraudulent financial reporting can help auditors in 
identifying this fraud scheme. 
On the other side, some researchers were interested in knowing whether the existence of other factors 
affect the perception of external auditors about the ability of red flags to detect fraud such as the research that was 
carried out by Moyes, G. and Baker, C. (2009; P.3). In this research, they listed the factors influencing the use of 
red flags to detect fraudulent financial reporting. Those factors were possession of an MBA or MA, external auditing 
experience, CPA License, prior exposure to red flags, attending conferences on red flags, in house training on red 
flags, the employer having previously detected fraud using red flags, the size of the firm, gender, position, and 
income of the auditor. Findings showed that CPA firms seem to be significantly more effective in fraud detection 
using red flags if their auditors have accumulated more external auditing experience, get graduate degrees, 
frequently used red flags in fraud detection, and attended red flags conference.  
Another research study by Hackenbrack (1993; P.5) who investigated the effect of auditor experience with 
different-sized clients on auditor evaluations of fraudulent financial reporting indicators using two experiments. He 
finds that auditors assigned primarily to audits of large companies placed more emphasis on the opportunities to 
commit fraud rather than auditors assigned to small companies. Reasons for this difference relate to differences in 
control structures between large and small companies and the effect of such differences on auditor perceptions of 
the importance of opportunities. One suggestion is that red flag lists need to take into account the effect of client 
size on different fraud risk factors.  
Moreover,(Hogan et al, (2008, P. 236) cited a research study carried by Knapp and Knapp (2001) where 
they examined the effects of audit experience on the effectiveness of analytical procedures in detecting financial 
statement fraud and find that audit managers are more effective than audit seniors in assessing the risk of fraud 
with analytical procedures. In summary several factors that affect the quality of audits have been found to be 
associated with the likelihood of client firms reporting fraudulent financial information. Specifically, these are audit 
firm size, the level of auditor industry specialization, the length of auditor tenure, and the experience of the auditor.  
Furthermore, Farber (2005; P.6) finds that fraud firms have poor governance relative to no fraud firms(fewer 
independent board members, fewer audit committee meetings, fewer financial experts on the audit committee, a 
smaller percentage of big 4 auditing firms, and a higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairman of the board. 
Thus, in our research study we were also interested to know whether the type of audit office and years of 
experience affect external auditors’ ability to identify red flags associated with financial statement fraud. However, a 
research carried out by Smith (2005, P.82) found that gender, auditors years of experience and auditors tenure do 
not appear to have a significant impact on auditors perception. Neither did the type of audit firms except for the two 
red flags, namely, presence of aggressive incentive programs and high vulnerability to interest rates. Auditor 
experience of fraud did not appear to have an impact on auditor’s perception except for one red flag which is “high 
turnover of senior management”.  
As a result of the above debate, we were also interested in exploring whether demographic factors can 
affect auditors perception about the ability of red flags to detect financial statement fraud in Egypt. Thus the 
following hypotheses were developed: 
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H3: There is a relationship between auditors’ experience and their perception about red flags for financial 
statement fraud 
H4: There is a relationship between type of audit office and their perception about red flags for financial 
statement fraud 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
  
A list of most of the possible red flags that can be associated with fraudulent financial reporting was 
prepared. These red flags were collected from different sources of literature including SAS No 99 and prior 
research studies. This list was then used to build a questionnaire that included questions about the ability of the 
listed red flags to detect each type of fraudulent financial reporting. Data collection was conducted in two phases: a 
pilot study phase and a questionnaire survey phase. A pilot study was used to pretest the questionnaire and was 
be followed up by interviews. The questionnaire was then refined according to the results of the pilot study 
performed by more than fifteen audit managers working in one of the leading audit firms with international 
affiliations. Then a questionnaire was delivered by hand to a number of external auditors working in audit firms in 
Egypt. The sample was selected randomly from domestic listed audit firms with the Egyptian institute of Accoun-
tants in Egypt. Our sample was affected by accessibility to audit offices and external auditors’ years of experience 
because the questionnaire included a number of highly technical questions that may require sufficient years of 
experience in the audit field. About 100 questionnaires were distributed to external auditors having different years 
of experience and working in different audit firms and offices in Egypt but only 93 questionnaires were collected.  
The questionnaire included 4 main sections where the aim of each section is to test each hypothesis. The 
first section for instance was testing the first hypothesis, the second section was testing the second hypothesis and 
the third section was testing the third hypothesis. The questionnaire was about 8 pages including a cover letter 
which was addressed to the applicants. The questionnaire included the research purpose, its main objective, and a 
request of cooperation from the part of the applicants in completing the practical part of the research. It also 
included a statement that ensures the confidentiality in using the responses of the applicants as it will only be for 
academic research purpose. All the questions were closed ended questions and the research used the nominal 
scale which provide only two alternative answers that each respondent was requested to choose from (Agree or 
Disagree). For each variable, a value of “1” was given to respondents who choose “agree” and the value of “0” was 
given for the “disagree” option. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data from the collected 93 questionnaires was analyzed using the SPSS. Frequency tables, other 
descriptive statistics such as the mean and standard deviation, along with contingency coefficient were used to test 
the research hypotheses. 
Tables (1) and (2) below show demographic information about the respondents. The respondents in this 
study have years of experience ranges from 2 years to more than 10 years and the sample of audit offices were 
from international, national, and local audit offices and firms. From table I, it is clear we have only 2 external 
auditors from the big 4 international audit firms because we had difficulty in gaining access to those firms. This is 
one of the limitations in our study. It is also shown that 75 auditors in our study were from national audit firms with 
international affiliations, and 16 auditors from local audit firms in Egypt. Table II however shows auditor years of 
experience. We had 31 auditors with less than 2 years and less than 5 years of experience. We also had 13 
auditors with less than 10 years of experience and 18 auditors with more than 10 years of experience in the audit 
field. 
 
Table 1. Frequency for the number of external auditors in each audit office 
 
 
    Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Big 4 2 2.15 2.15 2.15 
  National  75 80.6 80.6 82.79 
  Local  16 17.2 17.2 100 
  Total 93 100 100   
 
Table 2. Frequency for the number of external auditors with different years of experience 
 
    Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid less 2year 31 33.3 33.3 33.3 
  less 5 years 31 33.3 33.3 66.6 
  less 10 years 13 13.97 13.9 80.64 
  more 10 years 18 19.3 19.35 100 
  Total 93 100 100   
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Test of hypotheses; 
The first hypothesis predicts that SAS 99 red flags can help external auditors to detect financial statement 
fraud. The frequency table 3 and the descriptive statistics table 4 below support this hypothesis where the number 
of external auditors who agree on the ability of SAS 99 red flags for financial statement fraud to detect such fraud 
scheme was greater than those who disagree The descriptive statistics table 4 also shows that the average of all 
means is 86% and this shows a high acceptance rate for SAS 99’s red flags for fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
Frequency table (3) for SAS 99 red flags for fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Ranked SAS 99 Red flags for fraudulent financial reporting External auditors' opinion 
  Agree Disagree 
Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that limit his access to 
people or information or to his communication with the board members & 
audit committee. 90 3 
Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities. 
89 4 
Domination of management by a single person or small group without 
compensating controls 89 4 
Management changes its accounting policy such as changes in policies 
of pricing inventories or in valuating investments in order to manipulate 
the company’s financial statements 88 5 
Inadequate monitoring of significant controls and Management failure to 
correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis. 
87 6 
Ineffective accounting staff, IT or internal audit staff, and Audit committee 
members have little expertise in financial reporting. 85 8 
Known history of law violations or claims against the entity or its senior 
management alleging fraud 83 10 
Failure to record dishonest acts and other disciplinary actions and Lack of 
key employee training programs. 83 10 
Unusually high dependence on debt. 82 11 
Unreasonable time constraints on the auditor regarding the completion of 
the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report 82 11 
High turnover of senior management, counsel, board members or key 
employees may be an attempt to prevent them from learning too much 
about the firm. 82 11 
Many accounts are based on significant estimates or are subject to 
potential change that may have a financially disruptive effect. 
79 14 
A failure by management to display and communicate an appropriate 
attitude regarding internal control and the financial reporting process. 
79 14 
Tremendous changes in industry conditions such as decreasing demands 
on company’s products, technological changes, fast impairment in 
company’s products. 77 16 
Tight credit, high interest rates and reduced ability to acquire credit. 
77 16 
Management ineffectively communicates and supports the entity’s values 
or ethics or communicates inappropriate values or ethics. 
73 20 
Management setting aggressive financial targets and expectations for 
operating personnel. 72 21 
Difficulties in collection of accounts receivable from classes of customers 
who may be experiencing severe economic pressures. 
72 21 
A large percentage of the organization’s board members are not 
independent of the organization. 72 21 
Vague organizational structure to the extent that it is difficult to determine 
who controls the entity. 70 23 
The audit committee members meet infrequently or less than twice 
annually. 67 26 
Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other 
companies in the same industry 
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Table: 4. Descriptive statistics for external auditors' opinion on SAS 99 red flags 
 
N Valid 93 
  Missing 0 
Average of all means   0.86 
 
Red flags in Table 3 were also ranked according to their relative importance or likelihood of occurrence 
based on external auditors opinion. The most accepted red flags were; “Formal or informal restrictions on the 
auditor that limit his access to people or information or to his communication with the board members & audit 
committee”, followed by ‘management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities”, and “domination 
of management by a single person or small group without compensating controls”. Which are all from the fraud risk 
factor group “management influence over the control environment”. While the least important red flags based on 
auditor opinion were; “The audit committee members meet infrequently or less than twice annually” and the red 
flag; “Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other companies in the same industry” 
which belong to the fraud risk group “operating and financial stability characteristics”. 
On the other hand, the second hypothesis predicts that other red flags for each type of fraudulent financial 
reporting that were obtained from the literature can help external auditor in detecting each type of such fraud 
scheme. Results from table “5” below show that the number of external auditors who agree on the red flags 
associated with each type of financial statement fraud scheme were greater than those who disagree. The average 
of all means is presented in table “6” and shows high acceptance of those red flags based on external auditor 
opinion. Red flags listed in table 5 were ranked by importance based on external auditor opinion and the most 
important red flag in revenue recognition and timing difference scheme was; “The manipulation of accrued 
revenues realized from the company’s investments using incorrect amounts for expected cash dividends 
distribution”. while the least important red flag was “An unusual surge in sales by a minority of units within a 
company or of sales recorded by corporate headquarters”. In concealed liabilities scheme, the most important red 
flag was “ignoring tax liabilities and claims that are due” while the least important red flag was “unusual decline in 
the number of days’ purchases in accounts payable”. “Significant related party transactions not in the ordinary 
course of business without this fact being disclosed” was the most important red flag in improper disclosure 
scheme. In improper asset valuation scheme, however, the most important red flag was “The existence of assets 
that are based on significant estimates that involve unusually subjective judgments or uncertainties”. Table “6” also 
shows that the highest average means were in red flags associated with improper disclosure and this indicates the 
importance of considering these red flags by external auditors when auditing their clients firms. 
 
Table 5. Additional red flags for financial statement fraud 
 
Ranked Red flags for fictitious revenues and timing differences External auditors' opinions 
  Agree Disagree 
The manipulation of accrued revenues realized from the company’s investments using 
incorrect amounts for expected cash dividends distribution. 90 3 
 Not recognizing discounts given to customers. 90 3 
Improper recording of sales using accrued revenue account instead of accounts receivable 
account & justifying this by claiming that clients didn’t receive sales invoices. 89 4 
Recording returned goods after the end of the period 88 5 
Large, complex, and unusual transactions close to year end 88 5 
Tendency to smooth income or manage earnings by either keeping the books open after the 
period to record revenue or prematurely closing the books in order to shift income to the 
next period. 87 6 
A significant portion of management’s compensation represented by bonuses, stock options, 
or other incentives which can be a good reason for management to manipulate revenues in 
order to get bonuses. 86 7 
Understating allowance for doubtful accounts, thus overstating receivables. 85 8 
The company do not record returned goods from customers. 84 9 
A significant volume of sales to entities whose substance and ownership is not known. 83 10 
The company didn’t write off uncollectible receivables. 81 12 
Write off uncollectible receivables in a later period. 80 13 
Recognizing revenues too early such as billing customers prior to the delivery of goods. 
78 15 
rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other companies in the 
same industry 76 17 
Unusual growth in the number of days’ sales in receivables. 75 18 
An unusual increase in company’s sales from only the main branch of the company or from 
very few branches. 73 20 
Loss of a major customer that has created a pressure to replace lost revenues. 70 23 
An unusual surge in sales by a minority of units within a company or of sales recorded by 
corporate headquarters. 52 41 
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Ranked Red flags for concealed liabilities 
Ignoring tax liabilities or claims that are due 90 3 
No independent checks on bank reconciliations and payments 86 7 
Improper or lack of recording sales returns and allowances 85 5 
The existence of allowances for sales returns, warranty claims that are shrinking in 
percentage terms or are otherwise out of line with industry peers. 82 11 
Reducing accounts payable while competitors are stretching out payments to vendors 
78 15 
The existence of expenses that are based on significant estimates that involve unusually 
subjective judgments or uncertainties. 76 17 
Unusual decline in the number of days’ purchases in accounts payable 60 33 
Ranked Red flags for improper disclosure 
Significant related party transactions not in the ordinary course of business without this fact 
being disclosed. 92 1 
 Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations or claims against 
the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and 
regulations without this fact being disclosed. 92 1 
Not disclosing the company’s real disputes with banks relating to long term loans and its 
interests. 89 4 
Inadequate disclosure for the company’s financial investments. 88 5 
Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows from 
operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth. 89 4 
 
Ranked Red flags for improper asset valuation 
The existence of assets that are based on significant estimates that involve unusually 
subjective judgments or uncertainties. 92 1 
Non financial management’s excessive participation in the selection of accounting principles 
or the determination of significant estimates. 91 2 
Unusual change in the relationship between fixed assets and the related depreciation 
expenses. 86 7 
The company’s management shows an increase in its long term investment in assets while 
its competitors are decreasing such investments. 85 8 
Inadequate separation of duties among the functions of recording assets on books, keeping 
those assets, and authorization of these assets inside the company. 85 8 
Significant inventories or assets that require special expertise for valuation 75 18 
Recording fictitious values in the inventory account with no corresponding payables & 
liabilities to vendors. 91 2 
Reconciling deficits in inventory by recording some inventories which are in good state as 
scrap or spoiled inventories. 91 2 
Excessive or large adjustment after a physical inventory count 91 2 
Unexplained fluctuations in any inventory account 89 4 
Significant, unexpected, or unexplained increases in cost of goods sold. 89 4 
Physically moving inventory during test counts which may cause a fictitious increase in 
inventory. 89 4 
Misapplying lower of cost or market test 88 5 
False confirmations of offset inventory held by others. 88 5 
Close to physical count period, the store keeper prepares inventory disbursement 
documents & records them in the books without actually sending them to customers except 
at the beginning of the following year. 86 7 
Placing empty boxes with full boxes of inventory to deceive those performing the inventory 
physical count. 85 8 
Close to physical count period, an employee receives goods purchased and delays its 
recording in daily journal entries. 85 8 
Overstating inventory by including inventory in transit. 75 18 
The existence of a large amount of obsolete or slow moving inventory. 69 24 
 
Table 6. Average of all Means 
 
Red Flags  N Valid Missing Average means 
Fictitious revenues and timing differences 93 93 0 0.87 
Concealed liabilities  93 93 0 0.86 
Improper disclosure 93 93 0 0.97 
Improper assets valuation 93 93 0 0.92 
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The third hypothesis however predicts that there is a relationship between external auditors’ years of 
experience and their ability to identify red flags for fraudulent financial reporting. Contingency coefficient was used 
to get the relationship between these two qualitative variables. The P-value for each red flag ranges from “0.1 to 1” 
thus, they were all greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant difference among the opinions of 
external auditors having different years of experience about the ability of red flags to detect fraudulent financial 
reporting. This can be justified by the fact that other factors can be more important than experience in affecting 
external auditors’ ability to detect financial statement fraud such as direct knowledge about red flags for fraud 
through acquiring professional certificates in fraud detection or attending international conference about fraud.  
As for the fourth hypothesis which predicts that there is a relationship between the type of audit office and 
external auditors’ ability to identify red flags for fraudulent financial reporting, the P-value for each red flag was 
greater than 0.05 except for two red flags where P-value was less than 0.05. the first red flag is; “Unusual surge in 
sales by a minority of units within a company or of sales recorded by corporate headquarters” (P-value 0.004). this 
red flag is related to “revenue recognition and timing difference scheme”. The second red flag is “management 
ineffectively communicates and supports the entity’s values or ethics or communicates inappropriate values or 
ethics” (P-value 0.008). this red flag is related to SAS No.99 fraud risk factor group “Management influence over 
the control environment”.  
To sum up the research findings, our research supported the use of red flags as a tool for detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. This was consistent with the research carried out by (Glover et al, 2003, P4), 
(Saksena, 2010, p.4), (Bossard and Blum, 2004, p.2), (Silverstone and Michael, 2007, p.61), and (Wells, 2005, 
p.89). our research also supported the importance of ranking red flags according to their relative importance. This 
was consistent with the research conducted by (Vicky et al, 1996, p.5) and (Smith, 2005, p.82). However we had 
different ranks from that included in Smith research as he found that the SAS 99 fraud risk factors in the “operating 
and financial stability characteristics group” were the most important risk factors based on external auditor opinion. 
While our research findings showed that risk factors in the “management influence over the control environment 
group” were the most important red flags for fraudulent financial reporting. Moreover our research found that lack of 
proper disclosure about related party transactions is the most important red flag in improper disclosure fraud 
scheme and this is consistent with Hogan et al (2008; P. 244 as cited by Gordon et al; 2007) who stated that 
related party transactions is one of the top reasons cited for audit failure when a fraud does occur. The effect of 
demographic factors on auditor perception about red flag for fraud was not supported in our research and this was 
consistent with Smith research (2005, p.82) where type of auditor years of experience was insignificant and so was 
type of audit office except for two red flags. However the two red flags that were found significant in our research 




This research study determines whether red flags for fraudulent financial reporting listed in SAS 99 and in 
other literature can help external auditors in detecting such fraud scheme. The research also determines whether 
external auditors experience and the type of audit office affect external auditors’ ability to identify red flags for 
fraudulent financial reporting. This study provides several practical implications that are informative about the 
quality of red flags to be considered by external auditors and about fraud detection in general. First, results from 
our questionnaire suggest that SAS 99 red flags and the other red flags for each type of fraudulent financial 
reporting can be helpful for external auditors. SAS 99 provided a list of red flags related to each fraud factor like 
incentives, opportunities, and rationalization, but these red flags were too general and aren’t specifically related to 
any of the types of fraudulent financial reporting. Our research included a list of specific red flags that can be most 
likely associated with each type of fraudulent financial reporting and those red flags were highly accepted by the 
sample of external auditors in our study. These specific red flags can be used in conjunction with SAS 99 red flags 
to enhance external auditors’ ability in detecting fraudulent financial reporting. 
Second, the research also ranked all red flags for fraudulent financial reporting according to their relative 
importance based on external auditor opinion. Highlighting the red flags that can be most likely to occur will help 
auditors to focus their efforts more on high quality red flags during brainstorming sessions which will in turn 
facilitate fraud detection. Third, our research didn’t support the effect of demographic factors on external auditors 
perception about red flag for fraudulent financial reporting which indicates that educating external auditors about 
red flags will enhance their ability to detect fraud regardless of how different is their demographic factors. However, 
this study is subject to several limitations. First, we were not able to get more than two external auditors from the 
big 4 international audit firms to fill in the questionnaire and thus our results can’t be generalized to all audit firms in 
Egypt. Second we tried to list every possible red flag for fraudulent financial reporting but certainly there can be 
other red flags in the literature that aren’t mentioned in the research study. Thus future research should be more 
directed toward listing other red flags for fraudulent financial reporting in the literature and should test them using 
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